




Police **CORRUPTION** **in Pakistan**

Political, Socio-economic & Institutional
Perspectives

By

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Senior Superintendent of Police

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Foreword

It is my great pleasure and privilege to write some words on the book titled "Police Corruption in Pakistan: Political, Socio-Economic and Institutional Perspectives", written by Tariq Abbas Qureshi, Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP).

Like most of the developing countries in the world, Pakistan's public and private sectors are plagued with corruption and inefficiency. A number of public opinion polls conducted by international and national agencies suggest that people perceive police as one of the most corrupt departments in Pakistan. Although almost all the policing bodies in the world have been subjected to public scrutiny on account of corruption, the issues and factors responsible for police corruption in Pakistan are in some ways different from the rest of the world. This book seeks to explore the political, socio-economic and institutional factors that have led to the present state of the affairs.

This book argues for the adoption of a 'Harm Minimization' approach to address endemic corruption in the department. Taking an analogy from drugs law-enforcement policy, the harm minimization approach suggests accepting as a reality the pervasiveness of corruption in the socio-political and administrative spheres. The task then becomes to classify and prioritize relatively more harmful types of corruption. Identifying and tackling the most harmful effects of corruption and gradually developing a culture which promotes and rewards honesty can provide the basis for a process of reform in Pakistani police service.

Saleem Bukhari
Group Editor
The Nation, Pakistan

Police Corruption in Pakistan

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Tariq Abbas

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Introduction

Police in Pakistan are undergoing a major credibility crisis. According to public perception this is the most dreaded, corrupt and inefficient department. Police are being reported, ridiculed and reprimanded by society in general and the media in particular. Not a day passes without a cartoon or an article satirizing police being published in the national dailies. Television sitcoms portray police as a bunch of semi-literate clowns lacking common sense and proficiency. Having served at the middle management level for the past fourteen years in various policing assignments, the author can argue with some conviction that the reality is worse than the fiction. It is true that there is a rampant corruption in the police department and not a single tier or level is free from it. The irony however, is that while the petty corruption comes into

the notice of public, mega corruption is either not reported or even if it is reported, due to the factor of collusion between the four pillars of state, the executive, judiciary, legislature and the press it is effectively brushed under the carpet. Although the magnitude of police corruption is in no comparison to mega corruption pervasive in Pakistan's political, financial and military circles, according to public's view, "Police are the most corrupt Government Department in Pakistan". A survey conducted by Transparency International in the five countries of South Asia found that Police were considered the most corrupt department in four out of the five including Pakistan (Thampi 2002). Twenty eight percent of the Pakistan sample considered police the most corrupt agency in Pakistan. Such public perception is all the more important since no police agency can achieve a high level of proficiency and success without the co-operation of its clientele, 'The people'. According to Cohen, "Pakistan's police are poorly paid, poorly trained, and widely feared and distrusted by ordinary Pakistanis" (Cohen 2004: 157).

What are the dynamics of police corruption? How did it evolve? Are police really the most corrupt government agency in Pakistan? Why have political forces in the country allowed police to develop a culture of corruption? What socio-economic and political factors are responsible for the present state of affairs? Why despite great media coverage and strong public perception nothing is being done to improve the situation? Is it possible to control the epidemic of

police corruption in Pakistan? This book explores answers to these difficult questions. Its basic thesis is that, "Police Corruption in Pakistan is politicized; institutionalized and legitimized. It is so endemic that rather than trying to eliminate it altogether, a harm minimization approach should be adopted to tackle the issue". Relevant literature (which is scant due to a lack of research in Pakistan), practical experience of the author and a case study of National Highway and Motorway Police will be used to buttress the analysis.

Having set the parameters of the thesis in this introduction, Chapter 2 briefly discusses and critically assesses some of the discourses on corruption in general and police corruption in particular. The author will also try to establish the relevance of these debates to the ground realities and environment of policing in Pakistan.

In Chapter 3, the author will illustrate the research on corruption in general and police corruption in Pakistan as conducted by the outsiders. Literature on corruption views the phenomenon from a 'Western perspective'. Author's personal experience and premises will be tested in light of the relevant literature, newspaper reports and expert opinions.

In chapter 4 the effects of political forces on policing and the political interference in routine police activities will be discussed which has evolved ongoing collusion between politicians and police promoting systematic corruption. It will

be argued that a political culture of using the police department to further party and local political interests has undermined the impartiality of police and turned accountability into a farce.

Chapter 5 outlines the socio-economic environment which facilitates corruption in public and private sectors in Pakistan.

Chapter 6 investigates institutional factors responsible for corruption; the extent of inquiry is focused at three most important administrative units of policing in Pakistan, the police station, the district and the province. In addition, some of the most corrupt policing roles will be discussed in relation to the environment and the expectations of public/senior officers from those policing roles. It will be argued that the lack of funding for various policing mandates, extremely low salary structure, unrealistic targets, absence of forensic assistance to investigate crimes and sweeping discretionary powers provide strong incentive to indulge in corruption and renders the accountability system ineffective and impotent.

Chapter 7 outlines a case study of National Highways and Motorway Police the only government and police department declared corruption free by international agencies like 'Transparency International'.

Chapter 8 will be based on the author's submission in light of the literature review, case study of Motorway Police, and

suggest that police corruption should be understood and addressed from a structural/ functional perspective rather than the moralistic/agency approach. In this chapter author will advocate the adoption of harm minimization approach to tackle the issue of police corruption in Pakistan. Harm minimization discourse borrowed from the drugs law enforcement, suggests that the jingoistic solutions proposed to tackle a problem so pervasive in the society like drugs have failed in the past and will fail in future. A more prudent approach is to acknowledge the omnipresence of corruption, address the more malignant effects of the problem on priority basis and tolerating the benign ones till the time there are effective structural and institutional mechanisms in place to fully tackle the issue.

Chapter 9 consists of concluding arguments on police corruption in Pakistan.

Defining and Describing Corruption

Corruption has been a major issue in good governance for modern governments. The abuse of public office can be traced as far back as the earliest civilizations. In old times people use to present Government officials with gifts when they paid visit to them. Even the Kings used to accept such gifts and expensive gifts were considered to be the key to an instant access to the sovereign. One of the earliest books on Public administration written by Kautiliya in the fourth century B.C. in India outlines the issue:

Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the poison) that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the king's revenue. Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed in the government work can-

not be found out (while) taking money (for themselves) (Kangle 1972: .91 in Bardhan 1997: 1320).

What was once considered as a custom or tradition in modern statecraft is considered as corruption. The paradigm shift makes it extremely hard for the social scientists to interpret complex phenomenon like corruption. According to von Alemann, "Political scientists cannot agree on the following point: that corruption causes social damage" (von Alemann 2004: 25).

Like other social expressions there is no single set of words to define corruption. It depends on the social construction, customs and norms of the community. A social transaction totally legitimate at one time may be considered as corruption at another. McMullan (1961: 182) defined corruption as requiring the misuse of authority for personal gain: "A public official is corrupt if he accepts money or money's worth for doing something that he is under duty to do anyway, and that he is under duty not to do or to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper reasons". Lawrence Sherman (1978: 30) cited by Kappeler and Pagon, defines corruption as "an illegal use of organizational power for personal gain"(Kappeler 2000; Pagon 2000: 18).

J.S. Nye's definition as narrated by Scott is: "Corruption is a behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of pri-

vate regarding influences”(Scott 1972: 4). Explaining the dynamics of corruption Susan Rose-Acerman suggests, “Corruption occurs at the interface of the public and private sectors. Sometimes officials simply

steal state assets. But the more interesting and complex cases occur when a private individual or organization bribes a state official with power over the distribution of public benefits or costs”(Rose Acerman 1997: 31).

Corruption as defined by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) of Pakistan, “Involves behavior on the part of office holders in the public and private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are placed.” More simply it comprises “the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit”(Pakistan 2002: 5).

Police Corruption

“Virtually every police organization, in nearly every society, has experienced some form of scandal, corruption, deviance or breach of integrity” (Kappeler 2000: 15). Police corruption is similar and dissimilar to other corruptions prevalent in societies. It is similar in relation to damaging the socio-economic fiber of the society. Police, being the most important part of criminal justice system can play a major

role in the economic development of the country. An inefficient and corrupt police service erodes the confidence of the public in various institutions of state. According to Rose-Acerman, "Corruption can produce inefficiency and unfairness. It can undermine the political legitimacy of the state"(Rose Acerman 1997: 42).

The relation of Police Integrity to corruption can be regarded as a continuum, with integrity on one end and corruption on the other. Along the continuum proceeding from integrity to corruption, may be violation of administrative procedures, testifying, abuse of force and more (Kampanakis 2000; 503).

The difference between police corruption and other institutional corruption is that while most of the other forms of corruptions are collusional in nature, there is an element of extortion in police corruption. Consider a simple corrupt transaction when a trader walks into the office of an Income tax collector, pays bribe to the official who in return agrees to assess his business at a much lower rate. Both the parties emerge satisfied and happy with the transaction. There is no apparent victim in this case other than the state. Siffin, 1966 as quoted by Scott says, "Although the misappropriation of Government funds is dealt with severely, "the gentle extraction of funds from the public-so long as this is done discretely and not by overt coercion- is likely to be tolerated" (Scott 1972: 68). The police corruption on the other hand creates at

least one victim if not multiple victims in each corrupt transaction. If a police investigator decides to overlook important evidence by taking a bribe a victim is created. Similarly if a police officer in-charge of a jurisdiction allows illegal drugs business to take place in his area by taking money the whole community becomes a victim. The other element of police corruption is the use of coercive force to extort money abusing the vast discretion at the disposal of a police official.

According to Scott: Distinguishing between bribery and extortion is even more difficult. We commonly speak of extortion when an official demands an illegal payment and backs up the demand with a threat to punish, whereas bribery refers to the use of more positive inducement. Extortion is more common in such administrative activities as law enforcement, taxation and inspection where penalties are involved (Scott 1972: 67).

In Lord Acton's words of wisdom, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely". The nature of police work demands an inherent discretion in various decisions that a policeman has to make in course of his normal functions. The coercive powers to arrest, interrogate, and prosecute provides enormous leverage for corruption and extortion.

Klockars suggests that: By virtue of the fact that policing is a highly discretionary, coercive activity that routinely takes place in private settings, out of the sight of supervisors, and

before witnesses who are often regarded as the history of virtually every police agency bears testimony, an occupation that is ripe with for misconduct of many types (Klockars 200

Barring few exceptions the police corruption the cases amounts to petty corruption. Much complaints arise from this petty corruption.

According to Scott: Petty corruption is among lower-ranking officers. Typical insubribes (often extorted) to avoid prosecution fences. Although each transaction involves a sum, the cumulative total adds appreciably to petty officials (Scott 1972: 66).

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before witnesses who are often regarded as unreliable, it is, as the history of virtually every police agency in the world bears testimony, an occupation that is ripe with opportunities for misconduct of many types (Klockars 2004: 5).

Barring few exceptions the police corruption in most of the cases amounts to petty corruption. Much of the public complaints arise from this petty corruption.

According to Scott: Petty corruption is quite common among lower-ranking officers. Typical instances include bribes (often extorted) to avoid prosecution for minor offences. Although each transaction involves a relatively small sum, the cumulative total adds appreciably to the income of petty officials (Scott 1972: 66).

Although this petty corruption is in no comparison to the mega corruption in term of the net financial cost, yet it affects a citizen more directly. It is very hard to explain it to the public that the mega corruption results indirectly in petty corruption whereby the norms of the society are set to create an environment tolerating petty corruption. The other cause and effect theory may be the fact that the state loses enormous resources as a result of mega corruption resulting in lower wages for the bureaucracy which provides a potent excuse to indulge in corrupt practices. Scott suggests low income as the root cause of petty corruption (Scott 1972). The fact however remains that police corruption is in comparison

to the rampant corruption in various public and private sectors in Pakistan.

The veracity of police corruption was eloquently explained by Police Commissioner Wood who responded to a question on whether police corruption is inevitable:

Of course, you must remember that some police get a lot of temptations that you wouldn't get in other vocations. Are we any more corrupt than any other section of society? No definitely not. There's an old expression: 'We're all thieves at heart'. We'll all steal from income tax department. You don't see too many extremely wealthy police (Sydney morning herald, 1 July 1977, p 7)(Finnane 1999: 20).

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“Essentialism thus refers to the existence of fixed characteristics, given attributes, and historical functions that limit the possibilities of change and thus social reorganization” (Kaplan 2002: 7). Such essentialism obscures the influence of other socio-economic and political factors and oversimplifies the analysis as well as obscuring the potential for remedial strategies. It is not argued that cultural factors are insignificant what is stressed here is that there are other aspects which are more important and

Methodology

The key questions for this study are, what are the political, socio-economic and institutional factors responsible for police corruption in Pakistan? What policy intervention can help in controlling corruption? However, providing accurate answers is more difficult than may at first appear. There has been some research on corruption in Pakistan, but most of these studies have been conducted by outsiders. Most literature on corruption in countries like Pakistan views the phenomenon from a ‘Western’ perspective. Western perspectives generally are constructed from a position of power. Systems and institutions set in practice in the West form the benchmark for analysis with third world procedures generally seen as inferior imitations tainted by third world cultures. According to Brown, “This involved the benchmarking of Eu-

ropean progress as, in a sense, 'on time', and thus designation of societies with non Western social structures as civilizationally 'backwards'" (Brown 2003: 208). Implicitly or explicitly, such studies often suffer from cultural essentialism: "Essentialism thus refers to the existence of fixed characteristics, given attributes, and ahistorical functions that limit the possibilities of change and thus social reorganization" (Kapur 2002: 7). Such essentialism obscures the influence of other socio-economic and political factors and oversimplifies the analysis as well as obscuring the potential for remedial strategies. It is not argued that cultural factors are insignificant what is stressed here is that there are other aspects which are more important and worth inspection. Another problem with the Western research in the affairs of developing countries is the assumption by outsiders of the title of "expert" on issues in developing world, (see also (Said 1997). The problem with this assumption is that it totally ignores indigenous (Aboriginal) experience and expertise. Smallacombe elaborates this problem in the context of research on indigenous communities, whereby academics have assumed the title of "experts" in indigenous affairs and publishing authoritative text on indigenous culture.

Indigenous communities have experienced the processes where white academics have appropriated Indigenous cultural knowledge to become the all knowing 'experts' about Indigenous people, in fact more knowledgeable than Indigenous people themselves! (Smallacombe 1999: 16).

It will be argued in this book that the relevance of western research on police corruption in a country like Pakistan is limited. Western perspectives on police corruption do not consider the ways in which legal systems have been shaped by social, economic, political and historical forces such as colonialism, (see also (Verma 1999) (Kapur 2002). However, it is not implied here that the Western discourses are totally irrelevant, police corruption is a phenomenon experienced by most of the policing units all over the world and the author sought assistance from these debates when found relevant.

Having served in Police department for the past fourteen years in various policing capacities the author has developed an extensive knowledge about corruption in this institution. However, personal accounts carry little academic weight because it can be dismissed as anecdotal and preconceived. Verma faced the same circumstances while articulating his critique of the corrupt practices in Indian Police:

My comments may be construed to be subjective, biased and obviously personal accounts have their limitations. Nevertheless, in the absence of any other source of information these observations merit consideration and perhaps could contribute to a better understanding of the nature of Indian police and its shortcomings (Verma 1999: 267).

In many respects, in asserting the validity and relevance of personal experience and knowledge, the author is taking

a similar position to radical legal feminists, "Legal feminists emphasise experience as a source of knowledge, they produce alternative frameworks for understanding and making sense of the world" (Parasher 1996: 38). The author will be presenting and defending his personal experience as a source of knowledge, but will buttress these views with the opinions of social scientists, journalists and opinion makers other professionals and the research conducted by the international agencies. Finally the author will try to produce an alternative framework for understanding the police corruption by acknowledging its positive functions and suggesting the adoption of a harm minimization approach to control its extent and impacts.

The author therefore started his data collection simply by jotting down personal experience in the Pakistan police department. Assessment of the various roles within and outside the department which played pivotal roles in transforming the department into a systematically corrupt institution was then corroborated with broad literature review which consists of discourses in other policing units, newspaper articles and studies conducted by international and local agencies like Transparency International, Asian Development Bank, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) etc. The author also conducted a case study on National Highways & Motorway Police declared the only corruption free department in Pakistan by independent international and local corruption monitoring agencies.

Finally taking an analogy from drugs policy the author

explored` the possibility of adopting a harm minimization approach to control rampant corruption in police department in Pakistan.

Policization of Policing in Pakistan

The community suffers nothing very terrible if its cobbles are bad and become degenerate and pretentious; but if the Guardians of its laws and constitution, who alone have the opportunity to bring it good government and prosperity, become a mere sham, then clearly it is completely ruined. (Plato)The Republic.

The Politicians and the Police, who are supposed to uphold the rule of law and constitution of the country, are the worst violators in Pakistan. Without going in to the details and intricacies of corruption in the political circles of the country, this chapter will only focus on corruption which

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takes place at the interface of politics and police.

The Police station is the axis institution around politics of the country revolves. The worth of a p judged in terms of his ability to influence police. to Senior Bureaucrat, Tasneem Siddiqui, "The el tem we have evolved is basically clannish. We democratic and representative, but as a matter based on clans, tribes and biradaris" (Siddiqui 2 all the provinces of Pakistan, the clan loyalties other considerations. A voter prefers to vote for of his 'Biradari' (tribe, cast, and clan) even if t known to be of dubious character. While award tickets, political parties assess the representatio radari of the candidate in a particular constitue ring a person from ones tribe is considered as a society and severe societal consequences are fac cians and public servants who ignore these cons politician is also expected to support his voters criminal cases and other contentious issues, with sideration of right or wrong. The politicians ta they are not obliged by the investigating office fer and postings of Police officers is a politiciz Pakistan. The Inspector Generals have long b the powers to post the district Superintendent the provincial level the postings of District t (DPO) are entirely at the disposal of Chief Mi the provinces. Even the SHOs (Station Hous

takes place at the interface of politics and police.

The Police station is the axis institution around which the politics of the country revolves. The worth of a politician is judged in terms of his ability to influence police. According to Senior Bureaucrat, Tasneem Siddiqui, "The electoral system we have evolved is basically clannish. We may call it democratic and representative, but as a matter of fact it is based on clans, tribes and biradaris" (Siddiqui 2001: 37). In all the provinces of Pakistan, the clan loyalties override all other considerations. A voter prefers to vote for the member of his 'Biradari' (tribe, cast, and clan) even if the person is known to be of dubious character. While awarding election tickets, political parties assess the representation of the biradari of the candidate in a particular constituency. Preferring a person from ones tribe is considered as a norm of the society and severe societal consequences are faced by politicians and public servants who ignore these considerations. A politician is also expected to support his voters in disputes, criminal cases and other contentious issues, without any consideration of right or wrong. The politicians take offence if they are not obliged by the investigating officers. The transfer and postings of Police officers is a politicized activity in Pakistan. The Inspector Generals have long been asking for the powers to post the district Superintendents of Police. At the provincial level the postings of District Police Officer (DPO) are entirely at the disposal of Chief Ministers (CM) of the provinces. Even the SHOs (Station House Officer) were

posted in pursuance of directives issued from the CM secretariat. According to Khalil,

It would be quite interesting for our political leaders to study the case of the DSP in Sahiwal who was transferred at least five times; the orders of the Inspector General were overruled each time. Political considerations featured in the postings of almost 90 percent the DSPs (Deputy Superintendent of Police) and ASPs, and in all the SPs (Superintendent of Police) and DIGs (Deputy Inspector General of Police) postings, with no consideration to merit (Khalil 2005).

Political influence on the transfer and postings of Police Officers is a powerful instrument of controlling the police department. Former Inspector General of Police and the co-author of Police reforms Mr. Afzal Shigri comments, "The bane of policing in Pakistan has been a fractured command with a disorganized, ill-equipped, demoralized and highly politicized police force" (Shigri 2005). The author knows a Police Officer who is very honest and competent but he was never posted in a district for more than six months. Most of the times, in his career he remained on insignificant assignments in the police headquarters. Another police officer was so disillusioned with frequent postings that he used to refuse district postings and preferred to stay in the secretariat.

It is not unusual if a police officer asks a politician to get him a posting of his choice. But then such favor comes at a

price, including favoring the politician in police investigations, posting SHOs of their choice to establish the authority of the politician in his constituency, irrespective of efficiency and integrity. Very rarely an officer gets good posting without political patronage. The concept of 'Good Postings' refers to field assignments where a Police Officer is in charge of a jurisdiction exercising great influence on people's lives and liberties. The other aspect of good posting is the financial powers for honest officers and embezzlement & corruption opportunities for corrupt officials.

According to Khalil, Another thing that has afflicted the police has been the penchant of officials to cultivate relations with politicians in order to survive. Those without proper political connections rot as OSDs (Officer on Special Duty; posts created with no work or office, used as a punishment to the officials not obeying political orders) or are never given any field postings (Khalil 2005).

The author remember two politicians of the ruling party arguing in my office, one of them said to the other, "Did I ever interfered in your Police Station in the way that You are doing in mine?". It does not matter whether the politician has been elected to the provincial or national assembly. What matters is whether his party is in power or not. Therefore, a losing candidate belonging to the ruling party exercises more influence on police than his opponent who may be the member of the parliament. Except for the urban constituencies,

there is an overwhelming representation of the landowning feudal class in the politics of Pakistan. In urban centre the paradigm is shifting towards industrialists and businessmen. These distinctions are also blurring since the business class is also acquiring land holdings to assume political power and the feudals are investing in industries and business enterprises to gain the money factor which is very important to afford the luxury of participating in politics.

The politics of policing becomes extremely beneficial for the parties, the politicians and the police. For politicians, police are the best instrument available for controlling electorate and political opponents. It should be kept in mind that in the present scenario police are at the disposal of the provincial governments, it may be a democratically elected government or military dictatorship (more than 34 years out of 62). One of the most respected journalists of Pakistan Mr. Ayaz Amir says that, "Control of the police force is the dream of every Pakistani (and I daresay Indian) politico, for it means the power to harass, hound and make life miserable for one's opponents" (Amir 27th May 2005). Police are being asked to disrupt the opposition's processions, meetings, public gatherings. Police arrests, prosecutes, and tortures political opponents of the ruling party. Surprisingly the ruling members become victim after a while and they complain about police high handedness forgetting the fact that they have been doing the same in the past. For the past sixty two years this tragic-comic scene is being played again and again by different ac-

tors, the only constant factor in this drama are the police. The legislative aspect of providing police with unbridled legal authority to crush political opposition is a fascinating and horrific phenomenon. The draconian colonial laws to subvert political uprising are still not only present in text but are frequently practiced in spirit. Section 16 of the notorious MPO (Maintenance of Public Order) Act allows police to detain any person found guilty of disrupting public peace to a prison term of up to six months. Once the person is prosecuted under 16 MPO the Judicial function is superseded by the executive function and the appeals have to be made to the Home Department to withdraw the order. Section 144 of the criminal procedure code if enforced in a district bans any form of assembly of four or more people and they can be booked in violation of section 144. None of the successive governments ever thought of abolishing these laws, rather they are often found very handy. These are only few examples, the Criminal Procedure Code and other numerous Acts (root of these acts can be traced back to the colonial period) empower police to play havoc with the civil liberties and basic human rights of their own people. The human rights and civil liberties have been abused by the politicians/police to an extent that it has become a norm of the society.

Police order promulgated in 2002 tried to address these issues but the politics of policing prevailed and the reform process was never given a fair chance to take root and strengthen in due course of time.

Complaining about the hesitation of Provincial Governments to implement the Police Reforms of 2002, former Inspector General of Police and a member of Focal Group, which drafted the Police Order 2002, Mr. Afzal Shigri stated:

The provinces were agitated at the idea of an independent police force that would refuse to let itself be used to intimidate and victimize political opponents, and would only function within the bounds of law; they wanted a pliant and docile police command that would carry out orders unquestioningly (Shigri 2005).

The author is a witness to a number of pre and post election riggings organized and executed by police.

For the other stakeholder 'The Police', such sweeping powers open great avenues of corruption. When police are used to further personal political ends a culture of collusion is developed. Such culture effectively erodes the concept of accountability; whatever mechanism of institutional or public accountability is present is rendered toothless. Therefore if an honest Police Officer wants to initiate departmental action against a corrupt sub-ordinate, he can do little. The officer will be under a lot of pressure from the politicians to drop the proceedings. If the officer decides to go ahead with the action, the corrupt official will use his political link to influence the superior officer and will either get the punishment withdrawn or converted into a minor sanction having no ef-

fect on the career of the corrupt officer, making a mockery of the accountability system. Imagine a police organization where the SHO is directly connected to the Chief Minister of the province, what check and balance mechanism can be designed and implemented in such a scenario? According to Cohen, "Indeed, the last thing that any Pakistan government wants is police accountability" (Cohen 2004: 157).

Mr. Siddiqui points out the impotence of the accountability mechanism by stating: How do you expect an SP or DIG to be effective when he has no control over his SHOs or inspectors, and when loyalties and allegiances lie elsewhere? Police Officers become helpless creatures once the chain of command is broken. The last straw on the camel's back is the sidelining of honest, hardworking, and committed officers, which conversely means that the highly corrupt, incompetent, and pliable, people manage to have postings of their choice, using political clout and influence pedaling (Siddiqui 2001: 48).

The external accountability mechanism is guided by the legislature, judiciary, and press. While politicians are not interested in holding police accountable, judiciary does try to control police corruption but unfortunately its own credentials regarding integrity are inadequate. According to survey conducted in five countries of South-Asia, 96% of users reported encountering corruption in dealing with Judiciary (Thampi 2002).

The media unfortunately in Pakistan is undergoing an evolutionary phase, and is plagued with rampant corruption. The new found power being enjoyed by the media in Pakistan is selectively used by the media for corrupt vested interests. Smart Police Officers always keep good relations with the media. It is a widely accepted belief that the media extorts money from the corrupt police officer. Sometimes the favor is in kind, for example wine, women, and drugs. In return crime reports are mellowed down, less sensationalized and in some cases trivialized.

With all the internal and external accountability systems reduced to mere formality, Police are free to let the hell loose at poor and middle class people. The rich are saved from the clutches of a brutal police force for two reasons, either they have the socio political connections to neutralize police or they can simply buy the police.

According to Dr Shoaib Suddle (the first amongst only few PhD (Criminology) Police Officers in Pakistan): Citizens perceive police not as an instrument of law, but a corrupt, insensitive and a highly politicized force, operating mainly to look after the interests of the powerful. There existed no credible mechanism of policing the police, notwithstanding the fact that an increasingly expanding range of coercive powers at their command required stricter accountability controls (Suddle 2004: 101).

The following example will clearly indicate the politics of policing in Pakistan. On 14th of April 2005 the Federal Minister for Law and Justice announced reforms to curtail the police powers of arbitrary arrests and detentions saying: Illegal confinement by a police officer was being made an offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and the offender would also be liable to fine. He said wide powers of police to arrest were being curtailed and added that an amendment was being proposed to inform the arrested person about the gist of the offence for which he had been detained and to inform his family about the arrest (Reporter 14th April 2005).

Only two days after this reform bill was approved by the parliament a massive crackdown on opposition rallies was launched in the country to arrest thousands of political workers who were peacefully greeting their Leader who was released from prison after seven years.

Benjamin Sand of Voice of America reports from the Federal Capital: Pakistani police have detained the husband of exiled former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, as he re-entered the country Saturday to lead an anti-government rally. Hundreds of other opposition supporters have also been arrested in a government crackdown on political protests. The police... cordoned off the whole area and nobody is allowed to enter on the roads. There's no communication. The PPP insists thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of people are be-

hind bars (Sand 16th April 2005).

It is a classic example of the process of police reforms and its implementation being practiced in Pakistan for the past so many years and regimes. For the people at the receiving end Police are the culprits, people ask the question why the police obeyed illegal orders. The reason is simple those who try to resist are thrown out of the system. The bureaucracy identifies them as the trouble makers, unsuitable for important and prestigious field postings.

The Police Reforms of 2002 promised de-politicization of police, but within two years the political forces strike back and emerged victorious by proposing that the 'Annual Confidential Report' (ACR) of the District Police Officer will be written by the District Nazim (Head of Local Bodies in a District politically elected and a member of political party). ACR is an important document and hitherto the ACRs were written by the superior officers of the Department. The ACR of an officer is a purely administrative issue and on promotion ACRs are the only deciding factor.

Famous journalist Mr. Ayaz Amir comments on this situation: The nazims would write annual reports of DPOs and DPOs would be bound to follow the general directions of the nazims as regards law and order. The so-called reforms of 2002 (so-called because more show than substance) were meant to institutionalize political non-interference in police matters. The latest proposals, however, signify a regression,

aimed at eroding the last notions of police independence and returning the country to old-style politicization (Amir 27th May 2005).

Politicization of police in Pakistan is a fundamental issue and it is improbable that the issue will be resolved in the near future.

According to Tanzi: When the top political leaders do not provide the right example, either because they engage in acts of corruption or, as is more often the case, because they condone such acts on the part of relatives, friends, or political associates, it cannot be expected that the employees in the public administration will behave differently (Tanzi 1998: 576).

Socio-Economic Context of Corruption in Pakistan

“Societies aren't made of sticks and stones, but of men whose individual characters, by turning the scale one way or another; determine the direction of the whole” (Plato, Republic).

Pakistan is the developing country in South Asia. Pakistan was created in 1947, being a part of former British colony of India. Presently it has an area of 803,940 sq Kilometers. The population of the country is nearly 159 million, with a bulk of population engaged in agriculture sector. More than 40% of the population is living below poverty line ((USA) 2008).

There are some social facts to be kept in mind before exploring the details of socio-economic factors affecting police

corruption in Pakistan. Being a predominantly feudal society tribal and clan loyalties over ride all other considerations of merit and fair play. According to Bardhan, "It is widely recognized that in developing countries gift-exchange is a major social norm in business transactions, and allegiance to kinship-based or clan based loyalties often takes precedence over public duties even for salaried public officials"(Bardhan 1997: 1330). Exchanging gifts is also considered a social norm and refusing gifts is considered an act of utmost discourtesy. Bribers often exploit this social norm and present the government officials with expensive gift to obtain favors. Chattha identifies this form of corruption as 'Corruption of Authority' and suggests, "The leadership of the police department considers this to be a system of informal rewards, provided that the officers receiving such gifts are acceptable to the department and that the corruptors belong to the respectable class of citizens" (Chattha 2004: 167). The social acceptability of exchanging gifts provides the corrupt functionaries an opportunity to have their cake and eat it too.

Corruption in Pakistan is so endemic, pervasive and prevalent that it has lost its news value. It has not only been adopted as a norm in political, military and administrative spheres a common man is also prepared to take a shot whenever there is an opportunity. "Cheating on income tax, property tax or customs duty is quite pervasive"(Malik 2001: 367). There is no denying the fact that in Pakistan to get a legal service or facility one is required to pay bribe. I remember my Uncle paid 7% of the total loan amount, to the

House Building Finance Corporation official. Once the money was paid he promptly received the loan money without any inspection which the officials are supposed to conduct to ensure conformity to the building rules and regulations. According to Transparency International's "Corruption Perception Index Survey of 2004" Pakistan is ranked 129th along with Cameroon, Iraq and Kenya (Lambsdorff 2004). Ranking refers to most transparent Government to least transparent .

According to Rose-Acerman: The level of corruption is a function of honesty and integrity of both public officials and private individuals. Holding such factors constant however, the size and incidence of bribes are determined by the overall levels of benefits available, the discretionary powers of the officials, the riskiness of the corrupt deals, the relative bargaining power of the briber and the bribee (Rose Acerman 1997: 38).

Considering Rose-Acerman's hypothesis, in country where 40% people live below poverty line (see also (Chino 2001) 10), there are numerous benefits of corruption. The discretionary powers of the officials especially police are plenty. There is no risk involved in corruption, since the system is totally corrupt. The relative bargaining power of the briber and the bribee which in the context of police regards to massive discretionary powers police enjoy in their sphere of responsibility increases the opportunities for corruption. The mili-

tary government took power in 1999 with a one point agenda to prosecute corruption and introduce a transparent political culture in the country. After five and a half years the Chairman of National Accountability Bureau (NAB) admitted that, "NAB realized that the institution would fail to reduce corruption from the country on a permanent basis, unless causes of corruption were removed" (Khan 2004).

The pay package of police officials is in extreme contrast to the powers entrusted to them.

After the recent raise in salaries the starting monthly salary of a police constable was nearly rupees thirteen thousand only, of a head constable rupees fifteen thousand, Sub-Inspector (can be posted as S.H.O, to be discussed in detail later) rupees twenty thousand, Inspector (posted as S.H.O) rupees twenty five thousand, Superintendent of Police rupees fifty thousand, Inspector General of Police rupees hundred thousand. Some officials get extra allowances in relation to their specific assignments, but the over all picture is not different from the one painted above. The cost of living is extremely high; prices of food items and other commodities have increased nearly five times in three years, a decent two bed room apartment in cities can be rented at Rs. 15000. Petrol is eighty rupees a liter, electricity charges are extremely high running one air conditioner for eight hours a day cost around ten thousand rupees a month. There are very few government residences available for the low ranking of-

ficers. In big urban centers accommodation is not available for the high rank police officers. The police club of Lahore houses a number of senior officers living in small one or two bedroom suits since one cannot afford a decent accommodation in the salary. Since there is no system of health insurance in Pakistan police personnel have to bear the cost of health care in their paltry pay package. The annual inflation rate is close to double digits and the increase in salary other than annual increment is announced after five to seven years. The police officials are supposed to be on duty 24/7 and there are no formal duty rosters in operation. On the average a police official is on duty 16-18 hours a day without any extra remuneration.

According to Chattha: Low salaries and lack of health care and fulfillment of basic needs keep police officers depressed and disturbed. Pakistani police officers have no formal leave system and suffer from long, practically never ending hours they spend on the job, which leaves them frustrated and prone to use excessive force and abusive language in their interaction with citizens (Chattha 2004: 185).

The above mentioned factors not only provide sound justification and motivation for corruption they also contribute towards in-efficiency, incompetence and lethargy amongst the police officials. According to Bardhan, "One should also keep in mind that when today's rich countries had beaten the worst of corruption in their history, the average salary of an official was many times that of what obtains in most poor

countries” (Bardhan 1997: 1339). Police reforms initiated with the help of Asian Development Bank, totally failed to account for the pay and welfare aspect of police officials. The matter is conveniently ignored and brushed under the carpet. If the salary given to a police officer fails to bring food on the table there is a little hope that the new police reform can bring about any change in the policing being practiced in Pakistan. The societal tolerance of corruption and the economic hardship faced by the government employees are extremely important factors contributing towards widespread corruption in all the government bodies. While the other government agencies indulge in corrupt deals when a client approaches them, police entrusted with vast powers of search, seize and arrest can approach any citizen and extort money from them.

Finally sanity prevailed and the salary was doubled at least in the province of the Punjab. The increase is hailed by the rank and file of the police department. Although, no immediate effect is expected, however in the long run this pay raise may be the harbinger of change.

The Sites of Police Corruption in Pakistan

Sung refers to 'institutional guardians' as watchdogs of corrupt practices and suggests, "A strong civil society, a free press, a pluralistic political society, and an independent judiciary are crucial to maintain a low-corruption society" (Sung 2002: 146).

In this part of the paper those aspects of police corruption will be discussed which bear strong institutional tolerance to the corruption both in explicit and implicit terms. The helplessness of external (identified by Sung) and internal 'institutional guardians' is blatantly obvious due to various factors discussed in detail. The institutional aspect of police corruption in Pakistan is discussed at three administrative levels, the police station, the district and the province.

Police Station

Before understanding police corruption at the police station level there are few important facts to be kept in mind. First of all the police station which is the nucleus of all police operations and activities is not provided with any money to run its daily business. As Chino points out, "Police mandates are still unfunded, with the average budget for a police station per year being a mere Pak Rs8,000" (Chino 2001: 42).

The Government provides the utilities bills like electricity, gas and telephone. It can be said with full responsibility that had it not been the police department and the associated coercive power and nuisance of police most of the police stations will be without electricity, gas and telephone since a number of police stations are defaulters of hundreds of thousands of rupees in terms of payment of utility bills. The Government started the payment of cost of investigation as far back as 2003, and the average cost provide for conducting investigations is 500 rupees (Provincial capital Lahore last year got Rs. 40 million as cost of investigation against 75000 cases registered). It will be interesting to know only the crime scene map (to be prepared as a legal requirement) costs around rupees 1500. Money provided under the head of repair of vehicles is so insufficient that it only caters for the repair of some of the vehicles in a district. The fuel is rationed per

police station; the ration is inadequate to keep the vehicle running for almost 24 hours a day. The suspects in the lock up are to be fed by the "Moharir" (clerk) of the police station at least two times a day. The cost of stationary, photocopy etc is to be arranged at local level. From compilation of a police case file till its submission to the office of District Attorney, bribes are to be paid at all levels including the 'prosecution branch' in the office of District Superintendent of Police. During the investigation of a crime there are a number of forensic, serologist, chemical examiner and fire arms expert reports to be attached with the case file. These facilities are only provided at the provincial capital "Lahore". All the samples are to be send to these labs by a special messenger. It is the responsibility of police station to mobilize its own resources to bear all the above mentioned costs.

Another extremely interesting burden on a police station is to arrange resources to fulfill the demands made by the senior officers. Most of these demands are made by officers known to be corrupt. So if the Superintendent of Police wants to buy a computer for his son, all he has to do is to call one of the S.H.Os (Station House Officer, Officer In-charge of a police station) and it will be arranged. Even some of the known honest officers do at times bother their S.H.Os. The term used for the demands made by senior officers is known as; "Fatik" an Urdu version of "Fatigue" which is Military terminology means excessive labor.

Now let's discuss some of the corrupt roles in a police station.

The Beat Constables

The beat constables are marginally corrupt souls of the police department. The magnitude of their corruption is insignificant, often tolerated by the senior officers. The beat constables often stop motorcycle riders and ask for documents and driving license. If the documents are not produced, the constables will ask for money or the driver has to face the consequences (means impounding the vehicle till the credentials are provided). If the documents are produced the constables will still ask for money but in a more docile and friendly tone. The most common phrase used in such situation is 'Chai-Pani' (tea and water) meaning refreshments. The beat constables are also found picking fruits and vegetables from the hawkers in their beats. They also get free food and drinks on duty. Verma explains the corrupt practices of constabulary, "The constabulary extorts money from hawkers, footpath dwellers (Anandan, 1997; Indian Express, 1997), truck and bus drivers and claims a share from the collective earnings made by the police station staff" (Verma 1999: 267). Some of the beat constables take money from drug dealers; in return they provide valuable information to them, like the probability of a police raid etc.

The Moharir (Writer)

The Moharir is known as the mother of the police station. The concept of a mother in Pakistani society is the person who keeps the house in order. The Moharir is responsible to keep the police station record up to date (which means 25 registers). All the official correspondence, completion of case diaries and case files, the up keep of 'Maal Khana' the lock and key arrangement where all the case property, recovered stolen property, weapons are kept. The human resource management at the level of Police Station is performed by Moharir. Every day he brings out the duty roster of all the constables and other senior patrolling officers. He ensures that the duty is sent at all the crime hotspots, markets, business transaction points in the jurisdiction of Police Station. Moharir also arranges for the feeding the suspects in the police lock up. The fuel, repair and maintenance of the vehicle, all the dispatches to various labs in the provincial capita, the traveling expenditures for the delivery of various summons issued by courts within and out side the district, and at times, money to fulfill the demands made by the senior officers is organized by the Moharir

The Moharir is an institutional masterpiece since a Moharir is only of the rank of 'Head Constable' but the corruption potential a Moharir enjoys is better than some Inspectors. The other important aspect of the role of Moharir is the fact that despite a low education level a Moharir exhibits ex-

traordinary managerial skills. For the posting of a head constable as Moharir there are many aspirants in district, but one has to be efficient as well as corrupt to be an efficient Moharir. Therefore even if someone gets posted as Moharir using political connections it becomes very difficult to survive without proper skills. Every person who wants to launch a criminal investigation has to register an F.I.R (First Information Report) in the police station. To launch an FIR the Moharir must be paid, even if some one is a victim of crime, a white collar honorable person, a poor person victim of injustice and abuse. The amount of bribe depends on the financial capability of the complainant and the gravity of the offence. The author has personally experienced while on training, that a dead body was lying in the police station with bullet wounds and the Moharir kept the family of the victims waiting till the money was paid to register the F.I.R.

Being responsible for assigning various duties to the constables, the Moharir demands share from the constables sent to the lucrative beats. The demand may be fixed or flexible depending on the inter personnel relationship between the constable and the Moharir. People in the police station lock-up held as suspects provide a good opportunity for corruption. A family member who wants to meet the person in the lock up has to pay the Moharir. If some concessions are desired they all come at a price. A separate room, bed with clean blanket, home cooked meals, shower and clean toilet, these are the facilities which can turn the police lock up into heaven

or hell for the suspect. The one who pays the piper calls the tune.

Moharir also receives money in collusion with the S.H.O, from the drugs and prostitution businesses. In return the police patrol is not sent in that area which can otherwise scare the clients. Most of the organized drugs, alcohol and prostitution businesses strike deals with the local S.H.O and the Moharir.

Investigating Officer (I.O)

Depending on the size and crime load of a police station there are investigating officers in every police station. They work under the supervision of S.H.O. The I.Os are of the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector or Sub-Inspectors. S.H.Os are also entrusted with the task of investigations. Since S.H.O's role will be discussed separately, in this part the role of I.Os will be discussed. Primitive methods are adopted in conducting a criminal investigation in Pakistan. The fact that there is no forensic aid or finger prints support to authenticate the investigation, it is mostly based on hearsay evidence or the account of witnesses. "A serious lack of forensic assistance, poor training and dearth of facilities for collecting and preserving physical evidence have implied that most evidence is in the form of witness statements" (Verma 1999: 268). "The forensic capacity of the police limited to distinguishing between human and animal blood. The technical capacity of

the police is severely undermined by underinvestment in basic crime prevention and detection technologies, forensic laboratories, and communications equipment”(Chino 2001; 42).

The author has witnessed on a number of occasions that the I.Os are not capable of understanding the Medico-legal certificate (Issued in English). The most popular method of investigating crime is to round up a list of suspects and torture them into confessions. The process is done is gross violation of the law and human rights. The judiciary has to neglect complaints made in relation to police highhandedness for the simple reason that without torture and strong arm twisting tactics Police will not be able to solve a single crime. The I.Os also lacks the knowledge of various legal requirements necessary to prepare a case file and this result in acquittal of a number of well worked out cases. The author remembers a competent District and Session Judge who once said in an informal sitting that, ‘I challenge the district police to show me one case file prepared according to legal requirements’. This does not mean that Police are incapable of solving difficult cases. A phenomenon inexplicable to the author that the same police investigate complex cases with great proficiency. It has also been observed by the author that in a district there are few officers who bear major burden of crime fighting and detection. Such I.Os are considered as the asset of the department and the supervising officers have to protect them and ignore the corruption and high handedness com-

plaints against these officers.

The lack of forensic support provides enormous leverage to the investigating officers. The fact that a case file only contains the statements of both the contesting parties in to the guilt or innocence of the accused or as a last resort a tradition of giving a pledge on the religious book (Quran) called 'Nian' whereby the person testifying on the guilt or innocence of an accused says that if there is any willful misrepresentation of facts God will curse the person and his family. The practice of 'Nian' is widely accepted and practiced. In such circumstances it is impossible to ascertain the accuracy of investigation. The law also provides immunity to the Investigating Officer in this regard and very few investigators have been prosecuted against for conducting faulty investigations.

In the absence of any check mechanism the I.O is at a liberty to conduct the investigation at will. Money is extorted at each level of investigation. Even to the extent of declaring a guilty person innocent and vice-versa. Money is demanded keeping in view the seriousness of the offence and the paying power of the briber. Chattha, a respected colleague of the author, cited the Fraser Commission Report of 1902 on Police reforms which pointed out that, "The complainant has to give the investigating officer a present to secure his prompt and earnest attention to the case. More money is extorted as the investigation proceeds. When the officer goes down to the spot to make investigation, he is a burden not only to the

complainant, but to his witness (p.70)" (Chattha 2004: 178).

Nanda argues: The complainant has not only to pay for instituting a complaint but also to bear the costs of "entertaining" the officers who come for inquiries. The complainant also ends up paying for the investigative "expenses", especially transport as the department provides few vehicles to the investigating officers. Subsequent inquiries, arrest of the offender(s), prosecution in the courts are of course additional costs that the complainant has to bear if he/she is interested in pursuing the matter (Nanda, 1997 in Verma: 268).

One of the major sources of corruption is the investigation of murder cases. In Punjab it is a common tradition to implicate all the social and political opponents in cases of murder or grievous hurt. The investigating officers extort money from the innocent as well as guilty.

According to Chattha: Police urge the family of victims to add as many names as they want to the potential list of suspects. Since murders in Pakistan are mostly committed because of family feuds, the option of adding more names is readily accepted by the victim's relatives. Ultimately, those people who claim to be innocent are dropped from the list after they pay off the police (Chattha 2004: 179).

This result in great disillusionment in the contesting parties and the investigations are changed on a number of occasions (entrusted to another Investigating Officer). The senior

officers are empowered to change investigations.

Police are also required by the law to recover the stolen property in cases of property crimes. When the offender is arrested in such cases and identified by the victims, pressure mounts on the I.O. to recover the stolen property. If the property or a part of it is not recovered the case cannot be prosecuted. The judges refuse to listen to the I.Os in this regard. In most of the cases the property has been sold at nominal price and it becomes impossible to recover at the actual worth. This practice not only leads to corruption but most of the torture committed in the police stations is done either to obtain evidence or recover the stolen property. Numerous complaints are received in the offices of superior rank regarding lack of recovery of stolen property. In cases where the recoveries are made either by putting pressure on the relatives of the offender or by torturing the offender, I.Os pocket the recoveries leaving the victims high and dry. If police is relieved of this duty the author is confident that there will be at least 25-30% reduction in torture practiced in the police stations.

Investigation is the most lucrative police business, and earns fortunes for the corrupt police officers. Some times the bribe runs in to millions of rupees. The money is shared amongst the I.Os, S.H.Os and the other senior corrupt officers. Sharing of corruption money provides future opportunities as well as protection against departmental action and complaints.

Since torture is widely accepted and practiced it also provides corruption opportunity to the I.O. Often the relatives of a suspect in police lock up, approach the I.Os and offer bribe to be lenient to the suspect. According to Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, "The use of torture was extremely widespread in the country – with both police and prison officials responsible for inflicting it. No official was punished for this crime, to the knowledge of HRCP, with such impunity promoting further instances of torture" (Pakistan 2005).

Station House Officer (S.H.O)

S.H.O is one of the most powerful, effective and corrupt policing role in Pakistan. S.H.O is the officer in-charge of a police station; he is responsible of managing, preventing and detecting crime in the jurisdiction of the police station. He is also responsible of maintaining law and order and public peace. For performing such important tasks the S.H.O takes home a monthly salary of Rs 25000(after the recent raise) (see also ((CSIS) 2002). Explaining the role of S.H.O in Indian Police context (similar to Pakistani experience, even the Criminal Procedure Code section is the same Verma says: The police station in-charge called the Station House Officer (SHO) is the most coveted and lucrative office in the department. The SHO enjoys a large measure of autonomy, is the

“gatekeeper” for registering criminal cases, controls most of the criminal investigations and makes the decision to arrest suspects. These powers are enshrined in Sections 154-158 of the Criminal Procedure Code and have enabled the officers to indulge in extortion and many other forms of corruption (Verma 1999: 267).

In the area under the jurisdiction of the police station S.H.O is omnipotent. He exercises great discretion in running the affairs of his police station as well as managing crime. Every corrupt activity in the police station is done with the knowledge and understanding of the S.H.O. He receives his share from the Moharirs, I.Os and other patrolling officers. Normally they don't ask for a share from the beat constables, but in rural police stations where the opportunities are far less they even extort it from the beat constables (although such practice is not approved by the informal police culture). The role of S.H.O also carries huge burden of responsibility. Any serious crime reported in the jurisdiction becomes the responsibility of the S.H.O. The Superintendents of the District do not have the time to ask each I.O about the progress of investigation. S.H.O is expected to know about the up to date progress in serious crimes, the names of notorious proclaimed offenders, crimes detected and recoveries made, and the deployment of police personnel on crime hotspots. In short S.H.O is the broad spectrum antibiotic of the Police Department in Pakistan. In the district crime meetings S.H.Os are held responsible for the management of the

police station staff and the crime. This arrangement is also very suitable for the senior officers. Rather than going in to the details and monitoring the performance of all the I.Os it is very convenient to hold one man accountable for all the issues. A good S.H.O is considered as asset and often district S.Ps make personal effort to get effective officers posted to their district. The so called effective S.H.O becomes well sought after and subsequently they enjoy greater freedom in their actions during their posting. These practices have made the position of the SHOs very powerful in the department and most of the Superintendents are unable to keep effective control over their actions (Verma 1999). Honesty is seldom considered as a qualifying factor to be identified as an effective S.H.O. A Senior Superintendent of Police has debated this issue with the author; he said finally, "It is not possible for an S.H.O to be honest and effective at the same time".

No illegal and criminal activity can take place in a police station jurisdiction without the connivance of S.H.O. This belief is held by all and sundry in Pakistan. S.H.Os collect monthly from the drug dealers, prostitution dens, liquor dealers, shopkeepers selling contrabands and smuggled items factory owners found in violation of laws etc. A news story from a leading newspaper of Pakistan is just one of the examples one can read in Pakistani newspapers everyday.

An intelligence report has claimed the involvement of SHO of Aabpara police station in the liquor trade, being run

in Christian Colony, G-7/2, The News has learned. The report indicated Zubair, a constable of Aabpara police station as 'kaar-e-khaas' (the special man) of the SHO, playing the role of the go-between the SHO and liquor-dealers. "No policeman was allowed to patrol around the colony" (Anjum 18th April 2005).

The opportunities for the S.H.O seem endless and so is the scope of their corruption.

According to Verma: It is therefore not surprising that posting as SHOs of those police stations that have large markets, trade centers, industries or transport junctions are greatly in demand (Anandan, 1997). It is believed that even a few months of such postings enable the officers to earn much more than what they could receive in salaries for their entire service (Verma 1999: 267).

In a police station S.H.Os authorize and assign the investigation of all the cases to various I.Os. The investigations with rich potential for corruption are often performed the S.H.Os themselves. A fair share from all the other investigations also go to the S.H.Os. By sharing the bribe money the investigating officers ensure that they get lucrative investigations in future.

The vested power and nuisance in the post of S.H.O brings considerable political involvement, and every politician

dreams of having the S.H.O of his choice posted in police stations of his constituency. As stated earlier S.H.Os were posted in Punjab in pursuance of orders issued from the Chief Minister's Secretariat.

The leisure and entertainment expenditures of the senior officers are generally borne by the S.H.Os. It also includes various demands of providing electronics, furniture etc. S.H.Os generally are delighted to furnish such demands, since they in turn enjoy enough security and protection of the senior officers to carry out their own practices.

According to the law police officers are not empowered to investigate and inquire into civil matters. However, the S.H.O makes good money in resolving the civil disputes. This corrupt practice was identified by the Mitha Commission as far back as 1969-70, "Corrupt upper sub-ordinates have been found to obtain, illegal gratification during inquiries in to civil case" (Mitha 1969-70: 92). In Pakistan a number of transactions are not documented and people often refuse to pay what they owe to the lender. Illegal occupation of valuable property with sheer force is a wide spread phenomenon and S.H.O plays an important role in such civil disputes. Corruption in police department has facilitated the rise of 'Land Mafia' (a term used in Pakistan for land grabbers). The land Mafioso can grab the property of any person with force with the co-operation of S.H.O of the area. Politicians also play an important role in land grabbing exercise. The people with

no recourse to the institutions of criminal justice are forced to sell their property at nominal rates bringing huge profits to the land grabbers and police. In short S.H.Os is the axis and the whole corruption of the department revolves around his role.

The District

According to Verma, "Amongst the senior ranks most of the corruption comes from the administrative power associated with the management of the organization"(Verma 1999: 270). A district police is headed by an officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police. Depending upon the size of the district it is divided in to a number of Police Stations. S.P is held responsible for prevention and detection of all crimes in the district, maintenance of law and order and, the transfers and postings of all the police officers in the district. Monthly salary of a Superintendent of Police is approximately 60000 rupees), (see also ((CSIS) 2002). The annual budget minus salaries at the disposal of the S.P posted in a medium sized district is around 100 million rupees. Now here we have an officer who controls the all-powerful S.H.Os paid a monthly salary insufficient to pay the utility bills, entrusted with substantial Government funds and is expected to remain honest.

To start with most of the district S.Ps embezzle government funds. Their favourite head of account is the 'Traveling Allowance' (TA). A percentage (5-10) is deducted from

the TA bills of the constabulary; major chunk of this money goes to the S.P, while a part is kept by the accountant (one of the corrupt roles of the office of the District Superintendent). The TA is now the part of the salary. Although the bulk purchases for the department are made centrally at the Police Headquarters, money is also supplied under the heads of repair and maintenance, hot and cold charges, purchase of machinery and uniform equipment, and purchase of furniture at the district level. Although the money provided under the above mentioned heads is ludicrously petite even a fair share of such paltry sum is embezzled by the S.P/ accountant nexus. The officers who are known for embezzlement in government funds are called "Fundamentalists", (see also ((CSIS) 2002).

Postings and transfers of the S.H.Os, and the powers to take action against them provide the district S.Ps with an opportunity for corruption. Some S.H.Os are posted with clear understanding of providing a fixed amount each month called 'monthly'. Verma citing Kumar, who tells the Indian story which is not different from Pakistani story: IPS (Indian Police Service Officers, the middle and top management officers) officers make money from the transfer and postings of subordinate officers, take bribes and give favors" (Indian Express, 1999). They demand cuts from vendors supplying uniforms, office equipment and vehicles to the department; even extort from the business houses and subvert investigation of cases on pecuniary or political considerations (Kumar, 1996 in Verma 1999: 267).

S.Ps also influence investigations, since they are empowered to change any investigation in the district, they take bribes in investigations. However, very few daredevils indulge in such corruption since it becomes known to the public in quick time. Some officers who do not accept cash trouble their S.H.Os for favors in kind. The demands made (Fatiks) are often for the purchase of furniture, electronics computers etc. Generally officers posted as S.Ps of police in a district are honest officers. Relatively honest or moderately corrupt officers are those who restrict their corruption to the embezzlement of public funds. A good number of officers recruited through competitive examination known as PSP (Police Service of Pakistan) officers in the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police are known to be honest. After five years of service they are promoted in the rank of Superintendent of Police. Despite the fact that a lot of PSP officers are honest they fail to leave an impact on the sub-ordinate police officials. The author remembers a very honest S.P who categorically told all the subordinates to abstain from corruption when he took charge of a district. The same evening when he asked the positions of patrolling vehicles of police stations, he found that some of them are parked in the police stations. Furiously he asked the S.H.Os the reason, and they replied that the diesel provided by the government has been consumed and you told us to abstain from corruption therefore they are parked in the station. Next morning he called the crime meeting again and told the S.H.Os to carry on with the past practices but refrain from taking money in investigations.

The other devastating effect of this corrupt culture is that most of the officers who remain honest are either shunted out of the system (posted to sinecures, insignificant or less prestigious assignments, etc), or they become frustrated and adapt to the system. Some of the officers who were reputed to be honest as ASPs turned out to be extremely corrupt after promotion into the rank of S.P.

Accountant

The office of accountant is located in the office of the District Superintendent of Police. Accountant provides procedural help to the S.P in the embezzlement of government fund. Since most of the officers are not aware of the procedures regarding the maintenance of accounts, the accountants not only provide consultant services but they also share the pie. Not only the fake bills are processed to draw public money, the accountants rob the constabulary by taking a percentage of their traveling allowance. If any constable tries to report the matter his bills are not processed and are kept pending for months. Accountants also take kickbacks from the local suppliers of furniture and uniform articles. But their corruption depends on the competence and integrity of the District S.P.

OASI/SI

Office assistant sub-inspectors or sub-inspectors are responsible for the transfer and posting records of all ranks up to the rank of Inspectors posted in a district. All the investigating officers are also posted by the OASI/SI. Though the orders are issued by District S.P s but since there are hundreds of officers in a district normally the S.Ps ask their OASI/Sis to prepare the proposals. Most of the investigating officers pay bribes to the OASI/SI s to get the posting or remain posted in the police station of their choice.

Prosecution Branch

Prosecution branch is also attached to the office of the District S.P, all the cases to be submitted to the courts are scrutinized in this branch. Bribes are obtained from the contesting parties in a criminal case. Prosecution branch plays an important role in the conviction and acquittal of offenders and it provides them with numerous opportunities. Important evidence is removed from the case files; unnecessary delay in completion of case files is caused to obtain illegal gratification. Prosecution branch even pursues the case in way to give benefit to a particular contesting party.

The traffic branch which is one of the most corrupt police arms is not discussed here for the simple reason that it requires another volume to explain and discuss. In short the

traffic branch obtains monthly bribes from the transporters and then their vehicles are not stopped or checked for traffic violations. Traffic police checks the documents of the vehicles of the commuters and demand bribes if the papers are found incomplete.

Province

Police corruption at the provincial level is limited to the kickbacks from the contractors and bulk suppliers. As Verma quotes Times of India, "Another opportunity lies in receiving bribes from vendors supplying the large numbers of items, from vehicles to uniforms, guns and other paraphernalia to the police organization (Times of India, 1996). The police departments have large budgets and the purchases that are made annually involve huge sums of money (Verma 1999: 271). Another avenue at the provincial level is receiving kickbacks from the contractors of various development projects. Embezzlement in funds is also a common practice. Although the opportunities for corruption are limited at the provincial level their magnitude is phenomenal. Each corrupt deal involves millions of rupees.

Political interference is also massive at the provincial level since the transfer and postings of middle and high ranking officials is done at the office of "The Inspector General of Police". Personal contacts rather than bribes play important role in such decisions.

From the perspectives of subordinate honest officials an important grievance is that the police leadership at the provincial level fails to take stand on principled issues. This spineless attitude expressed by the top leadership has inculcated an attitude of helplessness and pessimism amongst the very honest and competent police officials. The compromises made at the top level by posting corrupt officials to prestigious posts, tolerating gross misconduct and corruption has left the honest officers confused and disappointed. Inspector Generals who tried to assert themselves were transferred and posted to insignificant assignments. Being posted as Inspector General of Police heading a province is the dream of every police officer. The stakes are so high that even extremely honest and scrupulous officers are tempted to make compromises. Chattha citing Amnesty International elaborates this issue by stating,

The police leadership succumbs to undue political interference; the decision-making process of the police department is influenced by politicians, who pursue the police administrators in order to obtain the police postings for few candidates and secure transfers of their favorite police officers to specific assignments (Amnesty International, 1997). The police officers use this outside influence to escape any attempt at effective internal accountability within the department, while the hands of those police administrators willing to address police misconduct are effectively tied (Chattha 2004: 183).

The above mentioned scenario presents a dark and gloomy picture of various aspects of policing being practiced in Pakistan. Purging police department from corrupt practices and officials amounts to cleaning of 'Augean Stables'. Surprisingly the same police department voted as most corrupt by its people came up with the most transparent and corruption free department in Pakistan. Now the author presents the case study of 'National Highways and Motorway Police'.

Motorway Police: A Silver Lining in The Clouds

Motorway Police started its operation in November 1997 on the newly constructed Lahore-Islamabad Motorway. The officers were selected from various policing units of Pakistan. The salary package announced was more than two times in each rank. According to Mr. Shigri, "Based on the initial stage of the scale, the total monthly emolument of an inspector in the NH&MP is Rs18,496, compared to which the emolument of an ordinary inspector is Rs7,216; a constable draws Rs9,745 monthly in the NH&MP compared to the ordinary constable's salary of Rs5,431" (Shigri 2005).

Decent accommodation, messing and monthly leave was ensured in addition to the eight hourly shifts (a concept hitherto unusual in policing units all over the country). Results were amazing, within a short period in time motorway police established its credentials as a highly professional, competent, courteous and above all incorruptible department in Pak-

istan. Within four years its scope was extended to all the National Highways of the country. To date there hasn't been any significant complaints of corruption or discourtesy. Hefty fines are imposed on commuters by the police with a smiling face, and people not only pay the fines they appreciate the attitude of Motorway Police. Influential citizens, military officers and politicians tried to use their influence and intimidate the police officers, but the leadership stood by the officers and within a short time motorway police became a credible department. The author was member of the team which initiated motorway police operations on National Highways. According to a Transparency International report, "The experience with the newly-established motorway police appears to demonstrate that sufficient pay, a well-structured job, effective monitoring and the creation of pride in the job can work wonders. This lesson should be remembered" (Eigen 2002: 5).

Ironically even the former President of Pakistan realizes the fact that better pay package given to the police officials in the Motorway Police produced incredible results. Speaking at the award ceremony of National Highways and Motorway Police, President of Pakistan General Pervaiz Musharraf appreciated the fact that the National Accountability Bureau has declared the Motorway Police as a corruption free department and credited its officers for this achievement.

He also said: This is all the more creditable as personnel

drawn from the same police force who are commented adversely on, performed so well. This happened due to better training, better working environment, better salaries and better command and control. Therefore, we can say that the menace of corruption in our society is not incurable, it can be cured, and we need to find reasons for this. He said, the reasons required for curing corruption and for honest performance include monetary incentives which give a reasonable living, and financial security in the old age (Pakistan 2003).

It can be argued that Motorway Police is not subjected to political interference in comparison with the local police. The fact remains that the traffic police in the districts is considered more corrupt than the executive police. There is a systematic arrangement of corruption in district traffic police, and the traffic police are free from political interference to a larger extent. Commenting on the success of Motorway Police experiment former Inspector General of Police Mr. Afzal Shigri articulates,

Initially in the NH&MP officers were posted on deputation from the provinces and they were definitely not the best. They were mired in a corrupt environment were transferred to new environments that provided excellent working conditions, best equipment, first-class training, gave them dignity and pride and insulated them from any interference in their professional duties. These same officers have against all predictions performed a miracle by working efficiently and hon-

estly. If this can be done in a proverbial corrupt traffic department, it can be done and replicated by other police throughout the country (Shigri 2005).

Another aspect of the success of NH&MP is the fact that the officers are left with little or no discretion. The amount of fine is fixed in each violation and the officer can not increase or reduce the amount of fine. Whenever a vehicle is stopped for a traffic violation the central control is to be informed that why a vehicle is being stopped before issuing a ticket. Since the control is informed the officer is left with little discretion.

Success of National Highways and Motorway Police in traffic law enforcement with professional competence and integrity indicates that by awarding real wages, better working conditions, and institutional insulation from political interference police corruption can be reduced and controlled. One key factor must be kept in mind that the achievements of Motorway Police are the result of a structural change approach rather than a moral approach. The institutional environment coupled with strong administrative and leadership support helped in complete transformation of the officials.

Sounds simplistic, but the reality is that the political culture is so much intertwined with police that it is almost impossible to insulate police from political interference. It is possible to expect pay rise, better working conditions etc, but no political interference 'forget about it'.

Controlling Corruption

Problems cannot be solved at the same level of awareness that created them. (Albert Einstein)

Since the state has failed to provide required resources for carrying out routine police business, the ground reality is that 'the police corruption in Pakistan is the grease which provides necessary lubrication to turn the wheels of policing'. Why should then the corruption be controlled? As demonstrated above, without corruption policing activities cannot be sustained. Suggesting utopian reform which fail the test of implementation, declaring war against corruption which is lost before a single bullet is being fired, and indulging in periodic 'spring-cleaning' through anti corruption campaigns which can't be sustained over a longer period of time, all are tactics that have failed in the past and will fail in future. It is time that the positive functions of corruption were acknowledged, and its harms minimized. It can be argued that an honest and effective police is every Pakistani's dream. The reality

on the other hand is that within the resources provided by the Government and the emoluments that the police officials get it is a Herculean task. The effectiveness of corrupt police often curbs the desire of purging the Pakistan police department of all corrupt elements.

According to Reiner cited by Dixon acknowledges the positive functions of corruption, points out: To insist on seeing corruption positively is not, it should be stressed, to imply approval: rather, it is to insist that to understand corruption in the context of the regulation of selling illegal services and substances, it must be seen as performing various roles and functions. Most importantly, corruption must be seen as a way in which police manage the competing elements of their mandate. 'The core mandate of the police, historically and in terms of concrete demands placed upon the police is the more diffuse one of order maintenance (Reiner 1992: 212 in (Dixon 1999: 64).

Police in Pakistan have been very effective in performing the task of order maintenance (although the principles of democracy, human rights, justice and fair play have been sacrificed to achieve this goal). Former Inspector General of Police Mr. Shigri commenting on order maintenance role commends the efforts of police in Pakistan, "Historically speaking, the functions of police and army were common and it was the armed forces that defended the country and maintained order internally. Police despite immense constraints on freedom to take action across the board have done a remarkable job and stopped the country from slipping into an-

archy”(Shigri 06/05/2005). Besides providing the required resources police corruption in Pakistan also helps in monitoring and control of organized crime. Most organized crimes are in fact conducted with police patronage (as discussed in the earlier part of this paper). This also applies, to a lesser extent in Western societies as Prinsloo points out, “Organized crime has to corrupt officials (e.g., police officers and officials of the Department of Internal Affairs). The ability to corrupt enables gangsters to buy protection from enforcement officials and to eliminate competition” (Prinsloo 2000: 268).

Dixon argues: Relationship between some police and major criminals have to be understood not just in terms of financial corruption, but rather as functionally related to modes of policing in which attempts are made to control and regulate criminal activities. Such control is, it is believed, unattainable through conventional law enforcement measures. As ICAC noted, ‘Information is used as currency. It is provided in exchange of something-money, or help in bail, or outstanding charges and sentences are probably the most common rewards sought’ (1994: 1) (Dixon 1999: 67).

The author’s experience is that most of the effective S.H.Os in Punjab Police have close links with criminals. It helps in effectively managing crime and the links with criminal world provides valuable information. It is however, very difficult to maintain the fine distinction between having good relationship with the criminals and becoming a criminal. A number of police officers cross the boundary and operate as criminals in uniform. Police connections with underworld

have been ignored by the leadership because of the invaluable information obtained in return.

As Dixon suggests: Corruption becomes a tool of regulation: bribes serve as licensing fees, the tangible part of what can be an informal system of administration. Police may not be able to suppress the activity, but are able to influence or control who is involved, where it occurs, and how it is done. In the sense, corruption is to be understood not as venality, but as a mechanism of power and control (Dixon 1999: 65).

The author is a witness to the effective control of corrupt police officers particularly in the case of drugs law enforcement. By regulating the drugs business in their jurisdictions, S.H.Os not only know the business locations, at the same time the drugs-crime nexus help them in obtaining important information on other serious crimes. Whenever there is public or media pressure regarding unbridled sale of narcotics, drugs pushers offer large amounts of narcotics for confiscation. Interestingly the offenders are seldom apprehended, the business becomes dormant for the time being and as soon as the public pressure is cooled down it resumes as usual. The same bizarre story is repeated over and over again and nobody bothers to ask why the drug peddlers were never arrested. Large confiscations (mostly impure) bloat the figures and statistics, all the stakeholders- namely supervisory officers, S.H.Os and the narcotics traders- are happy. Surprisingly public seems happy too.

It should be kept in mind that corruption as 'Standard Op-

erating Procedure' also has its downside. Corruption in police destroys proper functioning of criminal justice system. The service is only available to the rich while the poor and marginalized segments of the society have no recourse to justice. Corruption in the police department has helped organized crime and drug use in Pakistan flourish.

According to the 'National Drug Abuse Assessment Study 2000-2001': There are 500,000 regular heroin users and drug injectors – an alarmingly high rate by international standards. Cannabis, in one form or the other (marijuana, charas, etc), is the most commonly used drug in Pakistan in terms of lifetime use and prevalence, followed by heroin, alcohol and psychotropic substances. Among heroin users, 77% report using the drug on a daily basis. As for hashish/charas, 41% use it on a daily basis and 34% occasionally (UNDCP 2001).

The differential treatment of people by police has alienated the department from majority of the public. It is generally believed, and correctly so that police have links with criminals. This results in reluctance among the public to share information regarding crime and the whereabouts of criminals with police. This results in lack of efficiency and professionalism in the police. By conducting wrong and faulty investigations police effectively sabotages any chances of fair trial and dispensation of justice. One can keep listing all the negative consequences of having a corrupt police but in fact these problems are known to all and sundry. Let us now look at some policy option for controlling police corruption in Pakistan, keeping ground realities in mind.

No discussion about corruption control in Pakistan can be initiated without considering the level of public sector wages. The fact remains that the wages of police do not correspond to the powers entrusted to them. The motorway police example also indicates that better salaries can improve the situation to a greater extent. However, a number of studies have suggested that to sequentially reduce corruption substantial increase in wages would be required. Tanzi cites studies conducted by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) and Haque and Sahay (1996) which demonstrate that,

While an increase in the wage level is likely to reduce corruption, a very large increase would be necessary to reduce it to minimal levels. In other words, the fight against corruption, pursued exclusively on the basis of wage increases, can be very costly to the budget of a country and can achieve only part of the objective (Tanzi 1998: 572).

These studies are relevant in case of Pakistan since the size of Government is very large, and the system of public sector wages is complex. Moreover the government can not simply increase police salary by a factor of four to five (at the minimum required to bring some positive change).

Nonetheless, keeping all the factors in mind, it is suggested that the salary of the police officials should be increased at least to a subsistence level. Police wages should provide the bases for decent accommodation, health care, food and transport to the family of police official. No ser-

mons can stop police officials from indulging in corrupt practices while they have the excuse of doing so out of need rather than greed.

Once the issue of wages has been settled it is suggested that a 'harm minimization' approach should be adopted to control police corruption in Pakistan. A harm minimization approach suggests accepting as a reality the pervasiveness of corruption in the socio-political and administrative spheres. The task then becomes to classify and prioritize relatively more harmful types of corruption. Identifying and tackling the most harmful corruption and gradually developing a culture which promotes and rewards honesty is the core reform challenge for the Pakistani police service. According to Klockars, "The evidence from the U.S. history of corruption and brutality demonstrates that agencies are reformed not by weeding out bad apples but by creating an occupational environment in which they cannot survive" (Klockars 2004: 267). This structural approach is more likely to be positive outcome rather than moralistic approach.

This however does not imply that certain corruptions should be allowed under the garb of harm minimization. The issue here is to attend to the more harmful and lethal aspects of corruption, while slowly and gradually bringing institutional and structural changes and creating an environment conducive to honesty and integrity.

There have been attempts in the past to adopt a harm minimization approach. The Present Chief Minister of Punjab inducted three hundred university graduates directly into the rank of Inspectors in 1998, to be appointed S.H.Os in the

province of Punjab. The idea was to provide fresh graduates with best training in policing, under the supervision of some very honest and competent officers. The salary package proposed was more than three times the salary for the rank of Inspector. It was promised that the officers will be promoted to the next rank after five years. The government also promised to provide necessary expenditure to run the police station. However, this government was toppled and the project could not materialize in true spirit. It is difficult to comment on the effectiveness of such a measure since the project was never implemented in letter and spirit. Nonetheless, author and one of the survey respondents are convinced that most of these educated young S.H.Os were honest and competent.

The rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) is considered to be the most honest rank in police service. ASPs are selected on the basis of a competitive examination conducted by 'Federal Public Services Commission' and after training they are posted as a 'Sub-Divisional Police Officer'. Generally they are honest and incorruptible (though with the passage of time some of them also become 'run of the mill' in their approach). There have been debates in the past to appoint 'ASPs' as 'S.H.Os'. The administrative hurdles stopped the implementation of this project.

The above mentioned examples indicate that the governments in the past have tried to introduce honest and upright officers and to reform the position of S.H.O. Because the S.H.O is the linchpin of policing in Pakistan it can be agreed that if the element of corruption in this rank can be controlled

by providing the required resources coupled with strict accountability and supervision, this will have a far reaching effect on the overall integrity of the department.

Adopting a harm minimization approach at the police station level, the assignments of S.H.O, Moharir and Investigating Officers should be addressed on priority basis. The cost of conducting an investigation will help if rationalized (see also page 36). Forensic evidence collection and support will reduce the discretion of investigating officer. Another important step is the dilution of powers vested in various policing roles. For example introduction of forensics will erode the discretionary powers of investigating officers and S.H.Os. Connected to the forensic services is the issue of recovery of stolen property. The recovery of stole property should be the responsibility of courts. Even if the police is partially held responsible a judicial officers should supervise the process. This will not only help in controlling corruption, a substantial reduction in police high-handedness, and torture will result.

At the District level we have a Superintendent of Police paid a paltry sum of money as salary and responsible for disbursing large sum of public money. The disparity is so conspicuous that it is very hard for Superintendents to resist the temptation of embezzling public money. The District Police Officer also controls the transfers and postings of S.H.Os, therefore the potential for corruption associated to this office is great. Chief Minister of the Punjab appointed well reputed officers as District Police Officers and the result was encouraging. However, the practice relied a great deal on indi-

viduals: institutional reform was missing. To minimize harm at the District level not only should officers of exceptional integrity be posted- a strong institutional and political support is required to encourage and reward honesty amongst the officers.

It is suggested that joint bodies of police officers and politicians/citizens be set up to monitor the accountability process. It is extremely important to keep in mind the political reality of the country. Politicians want to have their say in police affairs. However, the presence of citizens and police officers in these bodies will neutralize the adverse consequences of politics and it will be harder for corrupting forces to influence politicians, well reputed citizens and police managers all at the same time. Representation may be given to the opposition politicians in such bodies.

A zero tolerance policy should be adopted where bribes are demanded during the investigation of heinous crimes like murder, rape and armed robbery.

Police leadership has also failed to come up to the expectations of public in general and police officials in particular. Often the principles of justice, merit and fair play are sacrificed at the altar of political expediency. To ensure strong institutional reformation it is proposed that the tenure of Inspector General of Police heading a province should be fixed to a term of two years. Constitutional safeguards must be provided against the transfer of the officer before the completion of term. Such a step is most likely to inculcate ad-

ministrative independence and reduce political interference.

Controlling corruption in an environment like police department in Pakistan is an arduous task. Some measures suggested above may be the figment of author's imagination. Nevertheless, it is an earnest brainstorming exercise to understand police corruption in Pakistan in proper perspective and provide an alternative framework of research and evaluation. A lot of research is required to be done to evaluate efficacy of various policy interventions. The author feels it pertinent to highlight the need for indigenous research by the police professionals and social scientists.

Conclusion

The police reform commission of 1969 concluded, "To keep the record straight it must be pointed out that the police is not the most corrupt department of civil government, nor are the officers and men always corrupt. Indeed some of them have displayed exceptional honesty and integrity of a standard unknown in civil departments" (Mitha 1969-70: 90). The statement holds true to date. Unfortunately however, police as an institution has failed to grow and prosper in Pakistan. There are individual examples of integrity, uprightness and competence but the collective picture is gloomy. Despite working day and night without any extra reward or remuneration Police as an institution has failed to gain the trust of public. In words of Police reform committee of 1985, "Qualities of efficiency and effectiveness in Police as an organization cannot be produced mechanically and on order; these qualities are to be evolved, sustained and consolidated by conceiving correct policies and by pursuing them consistently and resolutely"(Hayat 1985: 1). The absence of a strong institution to carry out policies independently and consistently has resulted in the present state of affairs. The Police Service

in Pakistan needs a comprehensive reform package, encompassing salary, welfare and training issues. Better working conditions, strong accountability mechanism and scientific forensic services are essential to improve the image of Police department in the eyes of public. Achieving these goals requires strong political will to have a neutral police that will serve the people rather than sustaining corrupt and inefficient governments. While there is agreement on some general principles such as the need for transparency, accountability, and public participation in anti-corruption efforts, much remains to be done at both policy and research levels. There is need for researchers, policy-makers, activists, and the public to collect information and direct resources towards anti-corruption efforts. Lack of indigenous research also hampers the efforts; both the government and police leadership must encourage research which is likely to facilitate the availability of multiple policy options.

As von Alemann points out “Instead of demonizing corruption, we should always take it into account as a part of informal politics in societies” (von Alemann 2004; 33). This thesis is an effort to understand the informal politics of corruption in the Police Service of Pakistan.

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Appendix A: Glossary

Biradri Extended family, tribe, clan etc.

D.P.O District Police Officer, Officer in the rank of Superintendent of Police (S.P), in charge of a district.

F.I.R. First Information report, a report made to police for the initiation of criminal proceedings.

I.O. Investigating Officer.

Kar-e-Khas A constable who works only for the S.H.O, work as an intermediary between S.H.O and the briber.

Maal Khana A lock and key arrangement in a police station where all the case property is stored.


Moharir Police Station Clerk, in the rank of head constable also known as writer.

Nazim Head of local body in a district, or union council.

Nian A practice of swearing on 'Holy Quran' to establish guilt or innocence of an accused.

S.H.O Station House officer, Police Officer in the rank of Inspector or Sub Inspector In-charge of a police station.

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